Introduction
In recent years, the management of risk has become a pressing matter on the agenda of financial institutions. One reason is the global economic downturn and its origins in the financial industry (Arnold, 2009; Roberts and Jones, 2009) . A second, albeit related, reason is the emphasis on risk management and financial safety margins in the banking industry provided by the Basel Accords (Wahlström, 2009) . Taken together, these contextual conditions beg the question whether the loan assessment behaviour of bank lending officers (LOs) remains unchanged in comparison to the situation a few years ago (Mullineaux, 2009 ).
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While there can be little doubt that risk is a key concept to take into consideration by LOs, some of the practices associated with a less risk-taking financial environment have been called into question in previous research. One notable example is Power (2004) , who raises questions concerning the extent to which recent tendencies are defensive reactions to a demanding environment. In turn, it has been claimed that such reactions are based on a simplified view according to which risk assessment is strictly numerical, with little or no need for professional judgement (Power, 2009) or supplementary "soft" information (Chua, 1996) . However, despite the importance of this matter, previous research offers little or no empirical evidence of defensive loan assessment behaviour among LOs.
The tendency towards greater attention to risk in the banking industry may affect LO loan assessment differently depending on the extent to which prudence and risk awareness already is part of the organisational management blueprints and the ways in which business is conducted (Mikes, 2009) . Ideally, the control system in operation should ensure a match between business strategy and loan assessment behaviour (Anthony, 1965; Berger and Udell, 2004) . However, while risk control allows the avoidance of Type II errors (credit losses) (Dietsch and Petey, 2002) , it remains difficult to measure Type I errors (denial of loans that would have been successfully repaid) (Deakins and Hussain, 1994a, b) .
For the individual LO, the above scenario constitutes a complex territory in which consistent and professional loan application assessment is expected. From the point of view of the applicant, defensiveness is likely to be especially problematic for small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that are financially constrained and less likely than large firms to have access to financing even during periods of economic prosperity (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006) .
Thus, the present paper addresses three research questions:
RQ1. To Whom It May Concern: what extent can loan applications from SMEs in a risk-averse banking environment be assessed defensively by LOs?
RQ2. In what forms might such defensive loan assessment behaviour occur?
RQ3. Why might LOs assess SME loan applications defensively and what are the possible effects on the bank and the LOs?
The empirical evidence presented in this paper derives from a study of LOs in branch offices of a major Swedish commercial bank. It should be noted that the recent financial crisis has had a negative impact on Swedish banks' lending to firms. After five years of uninterrupted growth, banks' lending to firms was 1,220 mdr SEK in 2008. Thereafter, lending started to decline, and in both 2009 and 2010 Swedish banks' lending to firms were approximately 1,050 mdr SEK (Svenska Bankföreningen, 2012) . The chosen bank is particularly intriguing as it suffered large credit losses in the wake of the financial crisis that started at the end of last decade, despite the fact that the Swedish banking industry had previously faced a severe crisis situation in the early 1990s that had required drastic changes and greater risk awareness. As will be explained, the recent circumstances resulted in practices based on tighter regulation, a new lending strategy and more focus on the control and support system for this bank. These developments offered an opportunity to address our research questions empirically.
Defensive loan assessment behaviour
The outline of the remainder of the paper is the following. First, we present our theoretical frame of reference by highlighting individual level loan assessment research, explicating the concept of defensive behaviour and linking it to the empirical context of interest here, and identifying plausible triggering mechanisms that according to previous research may underlie defensive behaviour. This is followed by the methods section. Thereafter we present and discuss the empirical evidence. In the final section, we provide conclusions, including our theoretical contribution, implications for practice and suggestions for future research.
2. Theoretical frame of reference 2.1 Individual level research on loan assessment It is part of bank routines that a LO's initial assessment of a loan application is conveyed to a credit committee, which makes the decision to approve or reject the loan application (Fletcher, 1995; Zambaldi et al., 2011) . The information that LOs collect, process and transmit about existing and potential clients can be divided in two categories: hard, quantitative information and soft, qualitative information. Prior literature suggests that LOs focus primarily on hard information such as financial statements, collateral, and cash flow forecasts in the loan assessment process (Berry and Robertson, 2006; Liberti and Mian, 2009) . Soft information includes the nature of the client relationship, reasons for the failure or success of the current owner/managers in the present and other business, market conditions, and the business idea deployed (Mason and Stark, 2004; Udell, 2008) . Such information may broaden the knowledge about existing and prospective clients (Behr and Güttler, 2007; Ferrary, 2002) .
One stream of literature in the loan assessment area draws on the human information processing research tradition (Yazdipour, 2011) , which addresses loan assessment from a judgmental point of view. Several studies draw on experimental designs and aim to identify decision strategies and biases (Andersson, 2004; Ruchala et al., 1996; Taylor, 1995) . One finding is that once an initial loan has been granted, escalation of commitment can cause LOs to suggest to the credit committee that it grants additional loans, despite information signalling considerable risk. The risk for such a bias is most conspicuous if a LO strongly identifies with the initial assessment, and if (s)he expects a low likelihood for blame should the loan not be repaid, due to diffusion of responsibility (Ruchala et al., 1996) . There are also indications that switching between different decision support systems improves LO performance (Wheeler and Jones, 2006) .
A second stream of research related to LO behaviour when assessing loan applications draws on agency theory. Findings suggest that if bad news will reflect negatively on the LOs' professional abilities, they choose not to report such news to bank managers (Herzberg et al., 2010) . Moreover, when there is a difference between the information collection tasks of an LO and the decision making responsibility of a credit committee, distance between these parties tends to lead to reliance on hard rather than soft information (Liberti and Mian, 2009 ).
The concept of defensive behaviour
Although the issue of defensiveness in relation to risk has been raised by Power (2004) , and its implications for strategic learning has been touched upon by Starbuck et al. (2008) , it would seem necessary to turn to earlier literature to determine how defensive behaviour can be defined. From a conceptual point of view, some bodies of work are QRAM 9,2 particularly notable, for example that of Argyris (1977 Argyris ( , 1985 Argyris ( , 1990a followed by Ashforth and Lee (1990) and that of Sterman (1994) . It is suggested that defensive behaviour is characterised by "little additivity in problem solving, low openness and trust, and high conformity and covering up of threatening issues" (Argyris, 1977, p. 119) . Ashforth and Lee (1990) position defensive behaviours[1] as part of political behaviour, i.e. discretionary social influence attempts to promote or protect the self-interests of individuals or groups (Porter et al., 1981) . Ashforth and Lee (1990, p. 622) define defensive behaviours as "reactive and protective actions intended to reduce a perceived threat or to avoid an unwanted demand of an individual or group".
More recently, other scholars use related concepts in different strands of literature. For example, Giammarino et al. (1997) examine defensive mechanisms and managerial discretion in takeovers; Balthazard et al. (2000) find evidence of dysfunctional defensive styles, which they link to a dysfunctional organisational culture; and Sweeney and Pierce (2006) analyse the manipulation of time reports among auditors in terms of a defensive mechanism. Trubik and Smith (2000) draw on the idea of defensive behaviour in relation to offensive (attracting new clients) and defensive (preserving existing clients) strategies in the banking industry, while Worthington and Patton (2005) analyse pressures for environmental performance and Wilson and Eilertsen (2010) illustrate proactive and defensive firm-level responses to the economic crisis. Sweeney and Swait (2008) and Chebat et al. (2011) highlight the role of branding and switching costs as defensive marketing tools for deterring customers from changing to another supplier.
For the purposes of the present paper, we draw primarily on Argyris (1977 Argyris ( , 1985 Argyris ( , 1990a and Ashforth and Lee (1990) when we define defensive behaviour among LOs in terms of reactive and protective actions intended to protect oneself from experiencing embarrassment or threat. The identity of a LO as a competent professional is built and maintained by keeping his/her conduct in line with the expectations of the credit committee and management of the bank (Jönsson, 1996, p. 103) . Ashforth and Lee (1990) propose that defensive behaviour typically is intended to avoid action, blame and/or change. For a LO engaged in assessing loan applications in a shifting economic climate, characterised by regulative initiatives, it can appear rational to avoid risk and situations that might reflect negatively upon the individual, thus avoiding blame (Ashforth and Lee, 1990; Herzberg et al., 2010) . One possible tactic might be to over-conform. If change threatens to disrupt routines and taken-for-granted behaviours, LOs can instead disregard the associated information or signals may go undetected. Avoidance of action may also presuppose the appearance of action. Thus, LOs can request and collect information beyond the level of information needed for their loan assessments, i.e. they are using information symbolically (Feldman and March, 1981) .
Mechanisms[2] that trigger defensive behaviour among LOs
Both Ashforth and Lee (1990) and Argyris (1990b) posit that antecedents to defensive behaviour may reside at environmental, organisational and individual levels. A financial crisis and a weak economic climate can be among the environmental level mechanisms that trigger defensive loan assessment behaviour among LOs (Goddard et al., 2009) . Increasing regulation through the Basel Accords can affect a banks' inclination to compete in the commercial lending market, as uniform capital requirements are advocated in the name of equal competition (Wahlström, 2009 ). Thus, LOs may pay increasing attention to formalisation and accountability (Ashforth and Lee, 1990) .
Defensive loan assessment behaviour
On the firm level, successful performance is often linked to the existence of a well-configured mission and business strategy, where different components are interconnected and contribute to the success of the organisation as a whole (Nilsson and Häckner, 2007; Siggelkow, 2001) . When a bank's strategy is ambiguous such that its' components do not fit with each other and/or they are unclear to the LOs, they may respond by attempting to protect themselves, thus behaving defensively. Moreover, the bank's management and credit committee are responsible for results and need to find ways to "reduce the probability and cost of error" (Argyris, 1977, p. 115) in loan assessments. One approach to take is to devise control and support systems that signal when a loan application deviates from desired tolerances. When credit-granting procedures are strongly regulated and standardised, LOs are expected to commence their assessment by processing information about an application through the control and support system used (Rada, 2008) . However, as suggested by Jönsson (1996) , the information processed in central control systems may contrast with information needs on a local level. On a local level, such as that of a LO, information needs may have concrete and intuitive features, and include causal processes as well as closeness to the unique case. Local information is less manageable and less transferable through a control and support system (Van der Veeken and Wouters, 2002) . It may thus receive relatively less attention when it comes to lending decisions, and errors related to its absence may go undetected. Central or "distant" control systems, on the other hand, tend to be oriented towards output, impartiality, distance from single cases, and an emphasis on overall trends, and demand corresponding information (Häckner and Nilsson, 2008) .
Control and support systems convey hard information within a bank's organisation (Rada, 2008; Udell, 2008) and structure the assessments made by LOs (Kumra et al., 2006) . These systems emphasise "facts" about a loan applicant (McSweeney, 1996) rather than more subjective and case sensitive impressions. The credit committees rely primarily on information from the control and support systems. Reliance on hard data on credit risk criteria processed in a control and support system, rather than on interpretations based on soft information, can represent a way for a LO to behave defensively in a demanding and challenging situation (Argyris, 1990a, b) . The use of numbers signals responsible and justifiable decision making when exercising control (Chua, 1996) . Soft information is typically not numerical, hence it is difficult to transmit from sender to LOs and onwards to the credit committee and bank management (Bhimani and Langfield-Smith, 2007) .
When bank management and the credit committee need to "reduce the probability and cost of error" (Argyris, 1977, p. 115) in loan assessments, there are two types of errors that may need to be considered. As mentioned in Section 1, Type I errors occur when a loan is rejected that has the potential to be repaid with interest, implying a net revenue loss for the bank. Type II errors occur when the bank approves loans that eventually result in a credit loss for the bank. However, evidence suggests that LOs tend to focus primarily on reducing Type II errors (Deakins and Hussain, 1994a, b) . One possible contributing factor is that the Basel Accords are essential to the regulative system of banks (Wahlström, 2009) . The Accords emphasise credit risk in order to promote prudence in the banking sector, which may contribute to the importance attributed to Type II errors in loan assessments. This type of error is detectable and therefore more likely to create embarrassment or threat than Type I errors. A fear of making mistakes among LOs is likely to encourage defensive loan assessment behaviour. QRAM 9,2 3. Method 3.1 Study context and research design Four domestic banks control 74 per cent of the Swedish lending market, suggesting an oligopolistic competitive situation (Svenska Bankföreningen, 2012) . Our data forms part of the results from a research program of SME loan assessments in one of these banks, which gave us permission to collect and analyse empirical data. The selected bank is one of the banks in which Wahlström (2009) studied perceptions of the Basel Accords, and it operates in several bank office locations in different regions. In this case study, we focus on the mid-Sweden region, and the LO and credit committee level, where the practice of loan assessment occurs and risk is managed (Wahlström, 2009 ). The mid-Sweden region includes three counties with a number of bank office locations, credit committees and LOs. LOs present their assessments of SME loan applications to credit committees including bank managers and experienced LOs, and the credit committee decides if a loan will be granted or not. LOs in the bank in this study are compensated only by their salaries, i.e. they do not receive bonuses if loan applications are approved.
At the time of the study, which took place at the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010, the bank was affected by a weak economic climate, new regulative initiatives including the Basel Accords, and a low intensity of price competition. As a result of the bank's credit losses in the wake of the recent financial crisis, a new lending strategy was formulated. It was emphasised that LOs should start to focus extensively on future repayment capability, i.e. a shift from historical to future-oriented information based assessments. It was also emphasised that the bank wanted to have clients with most of their financial affairs with the bank, i.e. a total client strategy. To manage and facilitate the loan assessment process the bank's control and support system was given a more prominent role than it had previously. Taken together, several significant changes intended to strengthen risk awareness had started to affect LOs at the time of the study.
In a case study, one key approach for mitigating the likelihood of biased results is to use highly knowledgeable participants (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) . LOs with less than one year's work experience in a bank office location in the selected bank and region were excluded due to the potential for them to not be able to answer the questions adequately [3] . At the time of the study, the total number of available LOs with at least one year's work experience, and regional bank managers with previous LO experience was 83. Seven LOs did not answer the questionnaire due to lack of time, leaving 76 LOs as participants. The sample included different categories of LOs with respect to position, location, gender, education and experience (Table I) .
The study was conducted using a combination of a questionnaire study and a focus group interview session. The reason for this blend of methods was that we wanted the LOs to first reflect individually on their work, and then to deepen and widen the knowledge about SME loan assessments through communicative interaction (Blumer, 1969; Qu and Dumay, 2011) . Five of the 76 participants participated in the focus group session. The choice of these participants was made with respect to background variables. In particular, we included both LOs in the field (3) and LOs in the position of bank managers and credit committee members (2) to capture different frames of reference (Wahlström, 2009 ). Table I . Participant categories with respect to position, location, gender, education and experience QRAM 9,2 elicit the participants' perceptions about SME loan assessments in a changing bank environment. The first three questions focused on possible changes that had occurred in loan assessments during the last few years and what the participants considered possible to assess more or less extensively. The next two questions focused on the LOs' likelihood of negotiating lending conditions in view of the situation at hand. Finally, the participants were asked if they had any further comments to add, and if they had experience as a business person. When analysing the written answers, we found indications of defensive behaviour as well as to the contrary. We used a coding scheme (Appendix), and decided to code each answer to each question in only one category, giving a total of 76 answers for each question. Regarding question 1, the first category was labelled "no change", indicating that a participant was unable to see that loan assessments in the bank had changed during the last few years. Another category of defensive behaviour was the perceived change towards collateral and/or a more intense use of the bank's control and support system (the second category). The third and the fourth categories -an observed change towards future-oriented information and/or future repayment capability, and an observed change towards both future repayment capability and collateral -were not classified as defensive behaviour. The assessment of future-oriented information was considered to require discretion on behalf of a LO rather than reactive and protective measures.
Data collection, analysis and limitations
Regarding the second question, the first and the fourth category -no need to increase any kind of information, and a need to increase all kinds of information -were interpreted as indications of defensive behaviour in accordance with the frame of reference section. Regarding the third question, only the first category -no need to decrease any kind of information -was classified as a sign of defensive behaviour. In questions 4 and 5, we considered "none or insignificant room for negotiations due to different triggering mechanisms" to be indications of defensive behaviour. For question 6, answers highlighting a strong focus on hard information used in the bank's control and support system or that a participant disregards personal relationships were classified as signs of defensive behaviour. Question 7 only included two categories (yes or no). Moreover, separate categories were used for participants that did not answer a particular question.
We individually interpreted and categorised the answers of the first 15 participants (20 per cent of the sample) before we compared our classifications and discussed the instances where they differed (procedures used by Butterfield et al., 1996) . In doing so, we categorised 92 percent of the answers identically, and more important, in all cases we agreed whether or not an answer was an indication of defensive behaviour. Where our initial classifications differed, we discussed our interpretations until we arrived at agreement. Following this initial categorisation, one of us categorised the responses of the remaining participants. We then discussed the few cases considered to be uncertain. These discussions resulted in minor adjustments to the categorisations.
The focus group interview with the five selected participants was held after an initial analysis of the findings from the questionnaire study, to develop a deeper understanding than that captured by the open-ended questions. During a three hour session in the beginning of 2010, we discussed the 76 participants' answers to the open-ended questions and the compiled findings. At the end of the session, we inquired about the bank's external environment, SME loan assessment procedure, lending strategy, and Defensive loan assessment behaviour control and support system, in order to confirm and extend our understanding of the LOs' working conditions. The focus group interview was recorded and transcribed, and each participant's statements were analysed in relation to the statements of the other participants and the 76 participants' written answers. There are several limitations of the present study that need to be mentioned. First, the study relies on a questionnaire and a focus group interview and could have benefited from other data collection approaches, including participant observation. However, the confidentiality of banks can preclude such data collection approaches, and as will be demonstrated in the next section, our findings from the focus group session validate the participants' answers to the open-ended questions. Second, the study does not allow us to empirically demonstrate explanatory cause-and-effect relationships between triggering mechanisms and different indications of defensive behaviour. Rather, the findings do indicate that relationships between triggering mechanisms and behaviours may be characterised by equifinality and multifinality (Norreklit, 2000) . Third, we are unable to establish a pattern concerning relationships that may exist among triggering mechanisms or among indications of defensive behaviours.
Findings
The findings related to each question in the questionnaire are numerically summarised in the Appendix. Below, these findings are presented together with findings from the focus group session. The main themes characterising our data are shown in italics. Overall, the differences between groups of participants are few. The most significant difference between bank managers and other LOs are commented on below. It should be noted that seven of the nine participants who did not reveal any signs of defensive behaviour were LOs with long bank tenure and little formal education (public school).
Indications of defensive behaviour
At an aggregated level, several indications of defensive behaviour are found. In total, 67 participants expressed such signs, 51 of them on two or more questions. Six of the participants insisted that there had been no significant changes in the assessment of SME loan applications over the last few years. This was expressed in the following way by a participant when answering question 1:
No, I cannot see that it has changed. The loan assessments are performed in the same way as before.
Furthermore, 17 participants were unable to suggest anything to assess more extensively (question 2), and 30 participants were unable to suggest anything to assess less extensively (question 3). The "lack of willingness to change" can be illustrated by the following response:
I do not think that it is necessary to add or take away anything from what we do.
In addition to the reluctance to change, four participants revealed a "desire to collect more information than actually used" thus indicating another kind of defensive behaviour. Those LOs would prefer to see an increased amount of all kinds of information (question 2):
It is important to observe the person behind the company, and to use both hard and soft information. This is the hardest part of the assessment procedure, and a lot of information is needed.
A total number of 41 participants wrote that these days they are more concerned about future-oriented information and the applicants' future repayment capability. Notably, all 13 bank managers expressed a forward-looking approach. As one banker manager noted in answering question 1:
The assessments are much more forward-looking today. The applicants' future ability to repay the loans has become more pronounced than ever. Earlier, our assessments were more historical information based.
The fact that all of the bank managers in the study expressed a forward-looking approach indicates a greater ability and/or willingness among those individuals to adopt this approach than among the other participants in the study. In contrast, many LOs in the latter group (23) expressed an alternative shift in focus. These participants articulated a perceived focus towards more risk reduction in line with the following answer (question 1):
Nowadays it is more focus on risk than opportunity. Everything is assessed from a worst case scenario.
The three LOs without bank manager experience who participated in the focus group, said that it was easier for members of the credit committees to make sense of hard information than soft. Soft information is considered difficult to capture in the bank's control and support system. Therefore, it needs to be transmitted by LOs in oral form to the committees. A possible reason for the perceived difficulties to persuade the committee members with soft information such as business idea characteristics is the LOs' lack of business experience. Only 20 percent of the participants (16 of 76) have previous experience as entrepreneurs or business persons, and in most cases their experience is rather limited and/or outdated. The three LOs argued that second opinions from colleagues are needed to convince credit committee members to approve a loan application based on soft information. Occasionally, these second opinions are used for confirmation and support of a LO's initial assessment.
Several LOs expressed that they are "keen to look good in the eyes of the credit committees", and the way in which LOs proposals are treated by the credit committees was given much attention in the focus group meeting. There was consensus that a credit committee is and should be the loan assessment decision-making body. However, it appeared rather surprising for the two bank managers in the focus group when one of the other focus group participants stated that:
One of the worst things that could happen is if the credit committee say no to my proposal to grant a loan to a client.
Such a situation was said to be almost equally embarrassing for the LO as a situation in which the credit committee approves a recommended application that eventually turn out to be a Type II error. The impact on LOs when the credit committee decides to reject a recommended loan application was expressed in a rather wordy answer by one of the 76 questionnaire respondents, who obviously had received a "slap on the wrist" when trying to convince the credit committee to grant a loan:
Defensive loan assessment behaviour I have become little harsher in the view of my work, according to the high collateral requirements and the focus on low risk. I have tried to be open to new ideas and see the possibilities in the loan applications since all clients are supposed to have a chance to borrow money. After being involved in a few credit losses and then being turned down by the credit committee, it is clear that I think more of the bank's loss risks than earning opportunities. Unfortunately! Moreover, 12 participants showed signs of defensive behaviour in answering the question (6) on additional information. These participants argued explicitly that they focus heavily on hard information used in the bank's control and support systems or they disregard personal relationships when assessing loan applications.
The impact of triggering mechanisms
A majority of the participants could identify circumstances that affected their discretion to negotiate loans negatively. For one thing, price competition was more intense between banks in the mid-Sweden region before the financial crisis. At that time it was rather easy for clients to manoeuvre banks to receive loans with more favourable conditions. When the economic climate weakened, the control and support system changed, and the price competition between the banks declined, clients had to take or leave the lending conditions offered. A total of 45 participants answered question 4 in a way that suggests decreased room for LOs to negotiate lending conditions. Moreover, it was confirmed in the focus group that the propensity of the bank and its LOs to determine lending conditions without negotiating with the clients increased after the financial crisis:
In a booming market, the competition between banks is very stiff. After the recession, the bank is prepared to lose good clients who want to borrow more money, if collaterals are not completely satisfactory. Negotiations on the terms of the loan are less common in recession. We calculate interest rates based on risk, which represents no negotiating conditions. It's up to the bank to decide if we want to do business with the client or not.
A perceived consequence of the regulations in the Basel Accords, and the bank's control and support system was articulated as a defensive approach to business in one participant's written answer to question 4:
The conditions in the bank today, with increased regulation and control, are likely to give us a defensive approach to business.
In addition to this, the focus group revealed that LOs' assessments commence with considering hard information required by the bank's control and support system. The design and use of this system was explained by the two bank managers in the focus group as a need for structuring the assessment process, and by the relative ease of transmitting hard information in such a way. A consequence of using the control and support system is that LOs consider the same basic criteria, independent of type of loan, so that all applicants are treated in a similar way. It was also argued that several LOs are emphasising risk more than earning opportunities when they assess loan applications. A reason for this was said to be that LOs are motivated by the control and support system to focus on collaterals and to avoid credit losses for the bank, i.e. Type II errors. A related comment was expressed in one of the written answers (question 1):
We nowadays use the control and support systems frequently. That has opened my eyes for risk, and I have become much more cautious than before.
The focus group interview confirmed that nowadays it is part of "the bank's lending strategy" to focus extensively on the future, and that every LO attempts to build an image of the applicants in order to foresee their ability to repay a loan with interest. It was also confirmed that the bank has emphasised risk reduction in the wake of the financial crisis, and in line with the Basel Accords. Notably, the focus group session revealed that it is possible for LOs to interpret this "double message" -a focus on both future repayment capability and risk reduction -in his or her own way. Such an interpretation could be defensive and, as noted above, 23 participants expressed a one-sided focus on risk reduction. As one participant noted in their response to question 1:
We approve almost no full funding, and require several types of collaterals (bonds, mortgage companies and/or pledges of private property). The applicants should be pretty strong financially to be allowed to borrow money needed for their business.
When the impact of "the banks' total client strategy" on the possibilities of LOs to negotiate lending conditions was considered (question 5), a total number of 70 participants saw such a connection. Around half of these described the importance of the relationship between LO and client and/or profitability conditions, while the others explicitly emphasised that the bank wants to have clients with most of their financial affairs with the bank:
The banks' total client strategy has a major influence. We can do a better arrangement for clients with all their affairs in the bank, and develop better relationships with those clients on a business level. These clients are given a larger room for negotiations.
The two bank managers in the focus group explained that the bank's total client strategy is a way for the bank to focus on the revenue side of bank affairs. The idea is to retain clients and to expand business with them. This indicates that the bank's total client strategy positively affects LOs' possibilities to negotiate lending conditions (in contrast to circumstances reducing the perceived room for lending negotiations). Accordingly, in this case only six participants showed signs of defensive behaviour, suggesting none or little room for negotiations with clients who have most of their financial affairs with the bank. The reason for the perceived lack of discretion to negotiate lending conditions was said to be the bank's control and support system.
Discussion
The discussion of findings is presented in three subsections in order for these subsections to serve as a bridge between the research questions posed in the introductory section and the conclusions which follow in the final section.
Defensive loan assessment behaviour
We find a fairly strong tendency towards unwillingness to change among LOs in the bank studied. Given the contextual conditions surrounding the bank at the time of the study, their lack of willingness to change could be considered rather surprising, although Wahlström (2009) found similar results in relation to reactions among LOs to the Basel Accords. In our case study, the lack of willingness to change among LOs appears to be related not only to regulation but also to the financial crisis, the weak economic climate, the Defensive loan assessment behaviour lowering of price competition, the bank's new lending strategy and the bank's control and support system. Moreover, while Ashforth and Lee (1990) tentatively suggested that defensive behaviour can be activated in order to avoid change, our empirical findings support their view in the specific loan assessment context. Our study also suggests a rather strong tendency towards risk reduction among LOs involved in SME loan assessment. This finding may perhaps seem less surprising than the previous one, given the external and internal conditions characterising the bank studied. Irrespective of this observation, however, we have been unable to identify previous research that empirically demonstrates how LOs' loan assessment becomes highly defensive and risk-oriented when surrounding conditions play out in a certain way. Our findings suggest different ways in which risk reduction can manifest itself in a loan assessment context. In particular, for a richer understanding of defensive loan assessment behaviour, the option not to approve a loan application needs to be supplemented with alternative strategies including the granting of loans with collateral or with a higher risk premium (interest rate), and with the possibility of granting financing only to total clients. It would also appear that defensive loan assessment behaviour might explain the difficulty to obtain financing which appears to characterise SMEs (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006) .
In the bank studied, LOs seem to rely fairly extensively on hard information when assessing SME loan applications. The findings also suggest that LOs consider it important to make a good, i.e. professional, impression when facing the credit committee ( Jönsson, 1996) . Indeed, making a good impression appears to be closely linked to the use of hard information in credit committee meetings. Reliance on hard information corroborates the pattern found in previous studies (Chua, 1996; Berry and Robertson, 2006; Kumra et al., 2006; Bhimani and Langfield-Smith, 2007) , although the potentially defensive connotations of this type of information use have not been highlighted in prior studies of loan assessment. The reliance on hard information found in this case study may not only be linked to the difficulty of communicating soft information from LO to credit committee members (Liberti and Mian, 2009 ) but also to LOs' attempts to protect themselves when presenting their loan assessments.
We find some indications that LOs can choose to over-conform by strictly assessing a loan application according to the standard procedure encapsulated by the control and support system, at the expense of considering particular nuances of an individual case (Argyris, 1977; Jönsson, 1996; Ashforth and Lee, 1990) . Our findings suggest that existing loan assessment routines begin with the use of hard information, which can be processed in the control and support system (Van der Veeken and Wouters, 2002; Kumra et al., 2006; Rada, 2008; Udell, 2008) . LOs are accountable to the bank and the credit committee and may prefer to make their case concerning a loan application based on information which is perceived to be "factual" (McSweeney, 1996) . LOs tend to be reluctant to promote applications that they are not confident that the credit committee will approve. This type of over-conforming behaviour is likely where a LO has previously received "a slap on the wrist" by the credit committee, and therefore is eager to avoid blame in the future.
We also find a few signs of defensive behaviour in terms of using information symbolically (Feldman and March, 1981) . These LOs are inclined to appear to act professionally by assessing loan applications using a large amount of varying kinds of information.
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In sum, the findings support the proposition that SME loan assessment by LOs can become defensive. Moreover, our findings point towards a broad conceptualisation of defensive loan assessment behaviour, which takes into account that the fact that defensiveness is not binary but a multifaceted construct.
Triggering mechanisms and effects on the bank and the LOs
In our case study, we find a number of factors that appear to serve as triggering mechanisms for defensive loan assessment by LOs in relation to SME loan applications. In particular, we find rather strong support for the impact of the recent financial crisis, the weak economic climate, the lowering of price competition and the increase in regulation on loan assessment on defensive loan assessment, such that defensiveness is encouraged by these factors. At the bank level, we find fairly strong tendencies suggesting that defensive loan assessment behaviour can be exacerbated by a bank's lending strategy, if it is open to multiple interpretations. While some LOs interpret the strategy to be primarily oriented towards future repayment capability, others focus on risk reduction related to the bank's control and support system and a one-sided orientation towards detectable Type II errors (Deakins and Hussain, 1994a, b) . In this case, the control and support system does not seem to ensure an ideal match between lending strategy and loan assessment behaviour (Anthony, 1965; Berger and Udell, 2004) .
Arguably, defensiveness has been linked to environmental factors by Power (2009) and Goddard et al. (2009) , and such a relationship may be inferred between regulation and LO behaviour in the findings of Wahlström (2009) . However, our empirical findings provide a richer and more complex understanding of triggering mechanisms, both external and internal to the bank, behind defensive loan assessment behaviour than prior studies. Moreover, our findings offer suggest that defensiveness may be also triggered by individual level factors including sense-making problems concerning soft information as a result of too little business experience among LOs, and a fear of making mistakes.
For the bank studied, our findings offer strong evidence that defensive loan assessment behaviour will lead to a reduction in risk exposure (which is supported by a decline in bank lending to firms in the wake of the financial crisis). On the one hand, this kind of effect can be considered precisely what a wise bank management may want to achieve under environmental conditions like the ones of interest here. On the other hand, it is interesting to also consider the effects of risk avoidance in relation to the propensity to commit Type I and Type II errors (Deakins and Hussain, 1994a, b; Dietsch and Petey, 2002) . In particular, a bank is likely to commit fewer Type II errors (make lower credit losses) and score favourably on performance measures in this respect. However, it is equally plausible that an increasing number of Type I errors will be committed as a result of defensiveness. In turn, such an effect will influence the survival and/or growth prospects of SMEs that turn to the bank for financing. For individual LOs, the above scenario will contribute to the avoidance of blame for errors committed (Herzberg et al., 2010) , as the rejection of loan application that would have been repaid cannot be recorded in the control and support system of the bank.
5.3 A preliminary framework for defensive loan assessment behaviour As outlined above, the findings from this case study suggest that external and internal mechanisms jointly trigger defensive loan assessment among LOs who handle loan Defensive loan assessment behaviour applications from SMEs, and this defensiveness should be considered a broad and multifaceted construct. Moreover, the effects of defensive loan assessment behaviour will include fewer Type II errors (credit losses) and more undetectable Type I errors. For individual LOs, defensive behaviour will contribute to the avoidance of blame for errors committed, as the number of detectable errors will decline. Another possible effect at the individual LO level is less risk-taking by avoiding change. These triggering mechanisms, behaviours and effects are summarized in a preliminary framework shown in Figure 1 . The preliminary framework proposes external triggering mechanisms on a macro level and internal mechanisms on a bank-and individual level, defensive behaviour in different forms as well as bank-and individual level effects.
Conclusions, implications and research suggestions
This paper uses qualitative data from a case study conducted in three different branch offices of a major Swedish commercial bank to develop knowledge concerning the phenomenon of defensive loan assessment behaviour among LOs who are responsible for handling loan applications from SMEs. This case was selected because the contextual conditions of the bank and the time period of the study offered a unique opportunity to conduct research in this area.
This study reveals that in a risk-averse banking environment, loan applications from SMEs can be assessed defensively by LOs to a considerable extent. It also shows that such defensiveness may take several different forms, including granting loans with greater requirements for collateral, charging a higher risk premium (interest rate), or exclusive granting of loans to customers with all their financial affairs with the bank.
According to our findings, the reasons for defensive loan assessment include external conditions such as the presence of a financial crisis and/or a weak economic climate, pressures towards regulation, and a decline in price competition (which may itself be considered a result of a financial crisis). On the bank level, our findings suggest that such defensiveness may be caused by an ambiguous lending strategy and/or by a control and support system that favours considerable reliance on hard information. On the individual level, we find that sense-making problems concerning soft information and a fear among LOs to make mistakes, also may contribute to defensive loan assessment behaviour. We also conclude that at the bank level, defensive loan assessment behaviour may result in more (undetectable) Type I errors and fewer (detectable) Type II errors, the latter of which will be monitored by the bank's control and support system. Moreover, individual LO may avoid blame or change as a result of this kind of defensiveness.
As our research was conducted as a single case study, the findings do not lend themselves to statistical generalisation. Instead, we propose that one contribution of this study is that it puts theory on loan assessment and defensive behaviour in contact with empirical reality, thus opening up the possibility for theoretical generalisation (Vaivio, 2008) . In terms of theory development on loan assessment, one implication of this study is that defensive behaviour in SME loan assessment should be considered as a multifaceted construct rather than a binary phenomenon. Another theoretical implication is that explanations of defensive SME loan assessment behaviour among LOs are complex and may require taking different mechanisms into account simultaneously. Hence, one implication for future research is that it will be fruitful to examine several independent variables on different levels of analysis in order to explain loan assessment behaviour.
For business owners and managers seeking bank financing, it would seem to be highly important to back up a loan application with financial "facts" that can be processed internally by a bank and presented to its credit committee in order to obtain a loan approval. As shown by Halabi et al. (2010) , this can be challenging for an SME owner/manager. From a bank managers' or a control and support system designers' point of view, our findings illustrate the value of understanding the operational implications of the way in which a control and support system is configured. It would seem that a system in this type of setting would benefit from being less oriented towards providing answers ("are key ratios in order?") and more oriented towards promoting inquiry, debate and dialogue ("why these key ratios? Is it plausible that management can improve ratios that aren't satisfactory?"). Finally, our findings suggest that one way in which the "undetectable" but nevertheless problematic Type I errors might be combated is if LOs were to regain discretion to negotiate lending conditions. The phenomenon of defensive loan assessment behaviour, its triggering mechanisms and effects, are relatively unexplored and are a fertile ground for future research.
Notes
1. Ashforth and Lee (1990) use the plural form, to convey that several behaviours may be defensive.
2. Arguably, "mechanisms" imply a technical relationship and it could be claimed that this term is more suited to physics than social science. One alternative would be "drivers" and another might be "triggers". Because "drivers" have rather forceful connotations and we are not entirely happy with "triggers", we have decided to stick to "mechanisms".
Defensive loan assessment behaviour 3. One result of this approach was that in the four cases where the participants had been employed between one or two years, their responses concerned the time period of their employment although the questions originally were designed to cover a longer time period (Appendix).
